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IN SEARCH OF CONGRESS: WHY AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
SEARCH OF A CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE VIOLATES THE 
SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE AND HOW CONGRESS SHOULD 
RESPOND 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 2006, the Justice Department, warrant in hand, searched the 
congressional office of Congressman William Jefferson in relation to an 
ongoing bribery investigation.1  The search was unprecedented in American 
history.2  Members of Congress voiced strong opposition to the search as a 
violation of the separation of powers.3  The House Committee on the Judiciary 
orchestrated an immediate hearing, characterizing the search as a “raid” and 
unanimously condemning it as a violation of the legislative privilege afforded 
members of Congress by the Speech or Debate Clause.4  But, to date, Congress 
has made no significant effort to assert its legislative privilege and protect 
itself from future Executive Branch searches. 
The case for congressional action is compelling.  An Executive Branch 
search of Congress raises significant separation of powers concerns.  More 
specifically, the scope of protection provided by the Speech or Debate Clause 
is directly at issue.  The Supreme Court decided only one Speech or Debate 
Clause case in the nation’s first 150 years.5  Since 1950, that number has 
increased significantly.6  In 1966, the Supreme Court announced in United 
 
 1. Reckless Justice: Did the Saturday Night Raid of Congress Trample the Constitution?: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1–2 (2006) [hereinafter House 
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary). The 
facts surrounding the search are discussed in more detail in Part II.A, infra. 
 2. Id. 
 3. John Bresnahan & Paul Kane, Raid Outrages Both Parties; Propriety of Search 
Questioned, ROLL CALL, May 23, 2006, at 1, 30; Ben Pershing, On Hill, Anger at Raid Grows; 
DOJ Defends Tactics, ROLL CALL, May 24, 2006, at 15; Ben Pershing, Party Leaders Escalate 
Criticism of Office Raid, ROLL CALL, May 25, 2006, at 23. 
 4. House Hearing, supra note 1.  The Speech or Debate Clause provides: “[F]or any 
Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in 
any other Place.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 5. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). 
 6. Some of the more notable cases decided by the Supreme Court include: Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); United States v. 
Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Eastland v. U.S. 
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States v. Johnson that the Speech or Debate privilege “prevent[s] intimidation 
by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”7  
However, since Johnson, the Justice Department has increasingly tested the 
scope of the Clause’s protection.  Justice Department political corruption 
prosecutions of federal public officials increased fifteen-fold between 1975 and 
1995.8  Thus, the constitutionality of an Executive Branch search of a 
congressional office, even when sanctioned by the Judiciary, merits Congress’s 
attention.  Congress should not ignore its significant role in determining the 
answer. 
This Comment argues that the search of Congressman Jefferson’s 
congressional office, though pursuant to a warrant, violated the Speech or 
Debate Clause.  It further argues that the Speech or Debate Clause empowers 
Congress to ensure that such a search does not recur.  Congress should enact a 
statute to redefine for itself the scope of the Speech or Debate privilege and to 
require the Executive Branch to use a subpoena to obtain documents from a 
congressional office.  But, in asserting an expanded privilege, Congress must 
develop a more robust internal disciplinary process to punish and expel its 
corrupt members.9 
The Comment proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the arguments 
traditionally used to interpret the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause.  
Because the text of the Clause is ambiguous, the Supreme Court has primarily 
looked to the Framers’ understanding and its own precedent to interpret the 
Clause’s meaning.  Part II turns to the facts surrounding the Justice Department 
investigation that culminated in the search of Jefferson’s congressional office.  
It examines the congressional hearing held in response to the search and the 
D.C. District Court decision rejecting Congressman Jefferson’s Speech or 
Debate Clause arguments.  Part III then analyzes the merits and shortfalls of 
the district court’s decision.  After determining that an Executive Branch 
search of a congressional office violates the Speech or Debate Clause, Part III 
discusses additional constitutional arguments given short, if any, attention by 
the district court.  Moreover, Part III recommends that Congress enact a statute 
 
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. 
United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United 
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
 7. 383 U.S. at 181. 
 8. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS 
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 85 (2006) (“Between 1975 and 1995, 
the number of prosecutions of federal public officials increased fifteen-fold—that is, by 1,500 
percent—during a time when ethics codes were put into place, ethics rules were tightened, and no 
objective observer of Washington thought that real corruption was actually on the rise.”). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a 
Member.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] IN SEARCH OF CONGRESS 255 
to protect itself from future incursions by the Justice Department.  Finally, the 
Comment concludes that Congress has an institutional prerogative to reassert 
itself as a co-equal branch of a separation of powers government. 
I.  INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE PROTECTION—
TEXT, HISTORY, AND MODERN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
The text of the Constitution serves as the starting point for its 
interpretation.  But, the text of the Speech or Debate Clause, while clearly 
bestowing a legislative privilege upon Congress, is relatively inconclusive as to 
the extent of that privilege.  Thus, to interpret the scope of the Clause, the 
Supreme Court has often turned to the Clause’s English origins and to the 
Framers’ understanding.10  As it has developed its Speech or Debate 
jurisprudence, the Court has also increasingly turned to its own precedent to 
determine the Clause’s scope.11 
A. The Text—What the Constitution Says 
The Speech or Debate Clause provides: “[F]or any Speech or Debate in 
either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any 
other Place.”12 
The Clause’s text, though clearly a statement of legislative privilege, fails 
to explicitly define the scope of activity encompassed by its critical terms.  
Indeed, the text raises more questions than it answers.  Exactly what is meant 
by the terms “Speech or Debate,” “questioned,” and “in any other Place” is 
ambiguous.  Clearly, speeches or debates made within the House or Senate are 
protected.  But, what about statements made in committee hearings13 or 
between members and their constituents?14  Arguably, these communications 
are essential to effective deliberation and debate.  Further, is a senator or 
representative “questioned” only when brought before a court and made to 
answer for speeches or debates?  Or, does a Fourth Amendment search of a 
congressional office also constitute a type of questioning?15  Finally, does “in 
any other Place” mean that Congress can question its own members?  The 
ability of each House to punish and expel its members may support such a 
meaning.16  But even this is not entirely clear.17 
 
 10. See, e.g., Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177–79; Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 201–03. 
 11. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 6. 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 13. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 (committee hearings protected). 
 14. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972) (constituent-representative 
communications not protected). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
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Ultimately, the text of the Clause is unhelpful in deciphering the intended 
scope of its protection.  However, the Framers adopted the text of the Speech 
or Debate Clause almost verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.18  
Thus, the Supreme Court has looked primarily to the Clause’s English origins 
and to the Framers’ understanding to interpret the meaning of the text. 
B. History—English Origins and the Framers’ Understanding 
The Speech or Debate privilege originated in the long struggle for 
supremacy between English Parliament and the Crown.19  It arose from judicial 
origins, Parliament being the highest court in England.20  The judicial nature of 
the privilege reflected the idea that, as the highest court, Parliament was not 
subject to questioning by lower courts or private persons; Parliament answered 
only to the Crown for its conduct.21 
In 1541, the Speech or Debate privilege was formally included in the 
Speaker’s Petition to the Crown.22  Importantly, the initial petition was a 
request; the Speaker petitioned the King for permission to speak candidly in 
debate without fear of retribution.23  The petition was premised on providing 
candid counsel to the Crown.24  But, as the House of Commons asserted 
greater authority over legislation and policy, it began to seek a form of security 
 
 17. Compare Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (“In times of political passion, 
dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily 
believed.  Courts are not the place for such controversies.  Self-discipline and the voters must be 
the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.”) with United States v. Brewster, 
408 U.S. 501, 518 (1972) (“Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try, and punish its Members 
for a wide range of behavior that is loosely and incidentally related to the legislative process.”). 
 18. Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of 
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1121 (1973). 
 19. See generally CARL WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 
(1970). 
 20. J.E. Neale, The Commons’ Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament, in 2 HISTORICAL 
STUDIES OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 147–76 (E.B. Fryde & Edward Miller eds., 1970); 
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1122.  Some accounts credit the privilege’s origin to 
the late-fourteenth century case of Thomas Haxey, a member of the House of Commons, who was 
condemned as a traitor after offering a bill to curtail the excessive spending by the royal 
household.  The initial death sentence was annulled by Haxey’s petition in 1399, claiming that his 
actions were done in the course of his Parliamentary duties.  See Léon R. Yankwich, The 
Immunity of Congressional Speech—Its Origin, Meaning, and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960, 962 
(1951).  Contra Neale, supra, at 149 (“Haxey’s case, then, does not prove the existence of a 
privilege of free speech.”). 
 21. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1122–23. 
 22. WITTKE, supra note 19, at 23.  However, the privilege was claimed much earlier.  Id.; 
see also Neale, supra note 20. 
 23. Neale, supra note 20, at 157–58. 
 24. Id. 
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against retaliation by the Crown.25  Throughout the late-sixteenth and early-
seventeenth centuries, the Crown firmly opposed repeated attempts by 
members of Parliament to assert the privilege as an “ancient and necessary 
right.”26 
The case of Sir William Williams triggered a seismic confrontation 
between the Crown and Parliament and caused the Glorious Revolution of 
1689.27  Sir Williams, the Speaker of the House of Commons, obtained 
numerous narratives about King Charles II’s “popish plot” to install 
Catholicism as the official religion of England.28  A committee of the House of 
Commons received the narratives, entered them into the House Journal, and 
ordered their private republication.29  In 1686, a year after succeeding to the 
throne, King James II filed an information against Sir Williams before the 
King’s Bench.30  Sir Williams argued that the printing of the narratives served 
the informing and inquiring functions—allowing members of the House of 
Commons to inform the nation and solicit further information that may aid in 
the prosecution of corrupt ministers of state.31  After James II inserted judges 
to the King’s Bench who favored an absolute monarchy, Sir Williams’ claim of 
privilege was denied.32  The Glorious Revolution ensued, culminating in the 
English Bill of Rights of 1689.33  To firmly establish the Speech or Debate 
privilege, the English Bill of Rights stated: “That the freedome of speech, and 
debates or proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned 
in any court or place out of Parlyament.”34 
The Speech or Debate privilege successfully survived the journey across 
the Atlantic to the American colonies.  Early colonial assemblies instituted the 
privilege.35  State constitutions36 and the Articles of Confederation37 
 
 25. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1123–24. 
 26. The cases of Peter Wentworth and Sir John Eliot are two such examples.  For a full 
discussion of each case, see Alexander J. Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom 
of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present, and Future As a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the 
Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (1968). 
 27. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1129. 
 28. Id. at 1130. 
 29. Id. at 1131. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1132–33. 
 32. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1133. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, reprinted in THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, 
TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 451 (11th ed. 1960). 
 35. See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN 
COLONIES 12 (1943); Yankwich, supra note 20, at 965. 
 36. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1135–36 (citing MASS. CONST. part I, art. XXI 
(1780); N.H. CONST. part I, art. XXX (1784)). 
 37. Id. at 1136 (quoting Article 5 of the Articles of Confederation). 
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incorporated the Speech or Debate privilege.  At the Constitutional 
Convention, the Framers adopted the Speech or Debate Clause with little 
debate.38  However, as Reinstein and Silverglate point out, the lack of debate 
indicates that the Speech or Debate protection was a firmly-rooted concept, not 
a thoughtlessly included provision.39  In fact, the Framers, fearing legislative 
excess, excised or curtailed many other privileges that Parliament had used as 
instruments of oppression.40  The Speech or Debate protection alone was left 
unchanged.41  Thus, the Framers deemed the protection essential to legislative 
independence in the separation of powers framework.42 
The dangers the Framers sought to avoid through the Speech or Debate 
Clause became apparent early in American history.  In 1797, Congressman 
Samuel Cabell, an anti-Federalist from Virginia, sent newsletters to 
constituents attacking the Adams administration’s war with France.43  Adams 
declared the newsletters ‘“seditious.”’44  A federal grand jury was impaneled 
and placed under the supervision of Justice Iredell.45  Thomas Jefferson, then 
Adams’s Vice President, drafted a petition to the Virginia House of Delegates 
condemning the grand jury investigation as an overt violation of the 
congressional privilege and of the doctrine of separation of powers.46  
 
 38. Id. at 1138–40. 
 39. Id. at 1136–39. 
 40. Id. at 1137. 
 41. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1138. 
 42. Many of the Framers stated this much.  For example, James Wilson, a prominent 
member of the Committee of Detail, responsible for the Clause’s drafting, stated: 
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his publick 
trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the 
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, 
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence. 
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). 
 43. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1140. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1141. 
 46. Id.  Thomas Jefferson’s petition, joined by James Madison, is particularly enlightening 
regarding the importance of a Speech or Debate privilege in the separation of powers context and 
merits extensive quotation: 
[T]hat in order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought to have, and the 
information which may enable them to exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common 
law, adopted as the law of this land, that their representatives, in the discharge of their 
functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the co-ordinate branches, 
Judiciary and Executive; and that their communications with their constituents should of 
right, as of duty also, be free, full, and unawed by any: that so necessary has this 
intercourse been deemed in the country from which they derive principally their descent 
and laws, that the correspondence between the representative and constituent is privileged 
there to pass free of expense through the channel of the public post, and that the 
proceedings of the legislature have been known to be arrested and suspended at times 
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Jefferson saw the indictment of Cabell by the grand jury as “put[ting] the 
legislative department under the feet of the Judiciary.”47  In response to 
Jefferson’s petition, the grand jury withdrew its indictment.48 
The history presented here, though highly abbreviated, nonetheless 
demonstrates two essential points.  First, the Framers understood the 
importance of the Speech or Debate Clause to the proper functioning of a 
representative, deliberative branch of government.  Second, the privilege’s 
history indicates that the privilege is not static, but rather functional, changing 
over time from its initial judicial origins in Parliament to a legislative privilege 
in the American constitutional scheme.49  The Supreme Court has used this 
history to interpret the scope of the Speech or Debate protection. 
C. Modern Judicial Interpretation 
The U.S. Supreme Court first interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause in 
Kilbourn v. Thompson in 1880.50  The Court based its interpretation in large 
part on Coffin v. Coffin, an 1808 Massachusetts Supreme Court case 
 
until the Representatives could go home to their several countries and confer with their 
constituents. 
. . . . 
[T]hat for the Judiciary to interpose in the legislative department between the constituent 
and his representative, to control them in the exercise of their functions or duties toward 
each other, to overawe the free correspondence which exists and ought to exist between 
them, to dictate what communications may pass between them, and to punish all others, to 
put the representative into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of vexation, expense, and 
punishment before the Judiciary, if his communications, public or private, do not exactly 
square with their ideas of fact or right, or with their designs of wrong, is to put the 
legislative department under the feet of the Judiciary. 
. . . . 
[A]nd finally, is to give to the Judiciary, and through them to the Executive, a complete 
preponderance over the legislature, rendering ineffectual that wise and cautious 
distribution of powers made by the constitution between the three branches, and 
subordinating to the other two that branch which most immediately depends on the people 
themselves, and is responsible to them at short periods. 
. . . . 
[I]t is left to that house, entrusted with the preservation of its own privileges, to vindicate 
its immunities against the encroachments and usurpations of a co-ordinate branch. 
7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158–61 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1896). 
 47. Id. at 160. 
 48. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18, at 1142. 
 49. Id. at 1144–45 (arguing effectively that the Speech or Debate Clause “must be shaped, as 
it has always been, by the contemporary functions of the legislature in a system of separation of 
powers”). 
 50. 103 U.S. 168 (1880). 
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interpreting the Speech or Debate provision of the Massachusetts State 
Constitution.51 
In Coffin, a member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives made 
defamatory remarks about an individual after the vote on a resolution had 
taken place.52  Because the accused member’s statements were not part of his 
legislative function, Chief Justice Parsons held that the Speech or Debate 
privilege offered the member no protection.53  But, despite its holding, Coffin 
announced the scope of the Speech or Debate privilege: 
  These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the 
members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of 
the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their 
office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal.  I therefore think that the 
article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it 
may be answered.  I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a 
speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the giving of a vote, to 
the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, 
and in the execution, of the office; and I would define the article as securing to 
every member exemption from prosecution, for every thing said or done by 
him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office, without 
inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, 
or irregular and against their rules.  I do not confine the member to his place in 
the house; and I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled to this 
privilege, when not within the walls of the representatives’ chamber.54 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s earliest Speech or Debate Clause decision adopted 
Coffin’s broad interpretation.  The Court, in Kilbourn, cited Coffin as “the most 
authoritative case in this country on the construction of the [Speech or Debate 
Clause], and . . . of much weight.”55  Kilbourn alleged false imprisonment 
against the Speaker and other members of the House of Representatives.56  The 
House held Kilbourn in contempt and ordered his arrest after he refused to 
testify and produce documents pursuant to a congressional subpoena.57  The 
Court held that Congress did not have the power to order Kilbourn’s arrest but 
recognized that the Speech or Debate Clause precluded the liability of the 
 
 51. Id. at 203.  Article XXI of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780 provided: ‘“The 
freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either House of the legislature is so essential to the 
rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action, or 
complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.’” Id. 
 52. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 224–25 (1808). 
 53. Id. at 36. 
 54. Id. at 27. 
 55. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204. 
 56. Id. at 170. 
 57. Id. at 175. 
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members of the House.58  The Court rejected a narrow interpretation of the 
Clause limiting its privileges to “words spoken in debate.”59  Instead, following 
its discussion of the Coffin decision, the Court read the Clause broadly, 
applying its privileges to “things generally done in a session of the House by 
one of its members in relation to the business before it.”60 
The Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of the Speech or 
Debate Clause in a criminal case in United States v. Johnson.61  Noting the 
sparse Speech or Debate precedent, Justice Harlan commented, “[i]n part 
because the tradition of legislative privilege is so well established in our polity, 
there is very little judicial illumination of this clause.”62  In exchange for a 
“campaign contribution” and “legal fees,” Congressman Johnson made a 
speech on the House floor urging the dismissal of pending indictments against 
a Maryland savings and loan institution.63  At trial, the Government 
extensively questioned Johnson’s motivations for giving the speech and 
introduced portions of the speech into evidence.64  Johnson was convicted of 
conspiring to defraud the United States.65  On appeal, Johnson argued that the 
Speech or Debate Clause precluded the use of the motivations for and contents 
of his speech as evidence against him.66  The Supreme Court agreed with 
Johnson, holding that “a prosecution under a general criminal statute 
dependent on [inquiries into the motivations and contents of a congressman’s 
speech] necessarily contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause.”67  The Court 
explained that the privilege “prevent[s] intimidation by the executive and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”68 
In a sense, Johnson was a fairly straightforward case.  At issue was the 
ability of the Executive and Judicial Branches to inquire into a congressman’s 
motivations for speeches delivered on the House floor.  Such an inquiry is 
directly precluded by the text of the Speech or Debate Clause.69  But, Johnson 
is important in significant respects.  First, it made clear that the Speech or 
 
 58. Id. at 201. 
 59. Id. at 204. 
 60. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204. Beyond “words spoken in debate,” Kilbourn specifically 
recognized the Clause’s application to “written reports presented in that body by its committees, 
to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of 
voting.”  Id. 
 61. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).  The Court decided only one Speech or Debate Clause case 
between Kilbourn and Johnson.  See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
 62. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179. 
 63. Id. at 171–72. 
 64. Id. at 173–76. 
 65. Id. at 170–71. 
 66. Id. at 188. 
 67. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 184–85. 
 68. Id. at 181. 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
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Debate protection extended to criminal matters.70  Second, Johnson spawned 
what some consider a more narrow approach to the protection provided by the 
Speech or Debate Clause in subsequent Court decisions—most notable in the 
criminal context are United States v. Brewster71 and Gravel v. United States,72 
two decisions decided by the Burger Court on the same day.73 
By its own terms, Johnson did not bar a prosecution not implicating the 
legislative acts of a defendant congressman.74  In Brewster, Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for the majority, held that such a prosecution faces no Speech 
or Debate bar.75  Senator Brewster, a member of the Senate Committee on Post 
Office and Civil Service, was indicted on charges that he solicited and 
accepted bribes on four occasions in exchange for promises to influence 
postage rate legislation that came before him.76  The district court dismissed 
the indictment pursuant to Johnson.77  The Government filed a direct appeal to 
the Supreme Court.78  In reinstating the indictment, the majority distinguished 
Brewster from Johnson.  The Court reasoned that “it is taking the bribe, not 
performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act.”79  Therefore, 
“[i]nquiry into the legislative performance itself is not necessary.”80  Johnson 
and Brewster thus indicate that members of Congress do not enjoy general 
immunity from criminal prosecution.  Consistent with the principle that “no 
one is above the law,” the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect members 
 
 70. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185. 
 71. 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
 72. 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
 73. For a critical commentary on the Brewster and Gravel decisions, see Hon. Sam J. Ervin, 
Jr., The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REV. 
175 (1973).  According to Erwin Chemerinsky, the Burger Court systematically decided cases in 
ways that increased executive and decreased congressional power.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, A 
Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court’s Jurisprudence in Separation of 
Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1987); see also John J. Gibbons, The Legacy of the 
Burger Court, in THE BURGER COURT 312–15 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998). 
 74. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185 (“We emphasize that our holding is limited to prosecutions 
involving circumstances such as those presented in the case before us.  Our decision does not 
touch a prosecution which, though as here founded on a criminal statute of general application, 
does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives 
for performing them.”). 
 75. 408 U.S. at 528–29. 
 76. Id. at 502. 
 77. Id. at 503–04. 
 78. Id. at 504. 
 79. Id. at 526. 
 80. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 527. In dissent, Justice Brennan clearly disagreed.  Id. at 530 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he indictment . . . certainly laid open to scrutiny the motives for 
[the Senator’s] legislative acts; and those motives, I had supposed, were no more subject to 
executive and judicial inquiry than the acts themselves.”). 
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of Congress from prosecution for illegal acts, so long as inquiry is not made 
into legislative acts or motivations.81 
Brewster further elaborated on the “legislative activity” test announced in 
prior decisions.82  Brewster distinguished “purely legislative activities” 
(protected by the Speech or Debate Clause) from activities that are “political in 
nature” (not protected by the Clause).83  Legislative acts are “things generally 
said or done in the House or the Senate in the performance of official duties 
and into the motivation for those acts.”84  “Political” activities include “a wide 
range of legitimate ‘errands’ performed for constituents, the making of 
appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing Government 
contracts, preparing so-called ‘news letters’ to constituents, news releases, and 
speeches delivered outside the Congress.”85 
The Court reiterated the distinction in Gravel.86  Senator Gravel read 
portions of the “Pentagon Papers” during a subcommittee meeting and placed 
the Papers on the public record.87  After news reports surfaced that Gravel 
arranged for the private republication of the Papers, a grand jury investigating 
potential violations of federal law subpoenaed Gravel’s aide.88  Gravel 
intervened to quash the subpoena.89  The Court held that congressional aides 
are entitled to Speech or Debate protection to the same extent as a member of 
Congress.90  However, the Court found that Gravel’s acquisition of the 
Pentagon Papers and his attempts to privately republish them were not 
protected speech or debate; the Senator’s actions were “in no way essential to 
the deliberation of the Senate.”91 
The distinction between legislative and political activities, along with other 
aspects of Brewster and Gravel, drew immediate criticism as narrowing the 
scope of the Speech or Debate Clause protection.  Senator Sam Ervin criticized 
the distinction as “arbitrary,” noting especially that the activities left 
unprotected by Gravel are performed everyday by Congress as part of its 
executive oversight function and informing function.92  Justice Douglas, 
 
 81. Id. at 527 (majority opinion); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966). 
 82. See, e.g., Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185. 
 83. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
 87. Id. at 609.  The “Pentagon Papers” was a classified Defense Department study 
surrounding the decision-making process of the Vietnam War.  Id. at 608. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 608–09. 
 90. Id. at 616 (“[F]or the purpose of construing the privilege a Member and his aide are to be 
‘treated as one.’”) (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir. 1972)). 
 91. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. 
 92. Ervin, supra note 73, at 184. 
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dissenting in Gravel, echoed Senator Ervin’s criticism: “It is the proper duty of 
a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to 
talk much about what it sees. . . . The informing function of Congress should 
be preferred even to its legislative function.”93  Senator Ervin reiterated the 
broader scope of legislative activity announced in Coffin94 and adopted in 
Kilbourn.95  Thus, Brewster and Gravel are seen as narrowing the scope of the 
Clause from that of early precedent. 
D. Summary and Comment 
Because the text of the Speech or Debate Clause does not clearly 
determine the scope of its privilege, the Supreme Court initially turned to the 
Framers’ understanding for its interpretation.  Basing its initial interpretation 
on the Clause’s English origins, statements made by the Framers, and the 
Framers’ reactions to the earliest abuses, the Coffin court cast the scope of the 
Clause’s privilege in broad terms, encompassing “every thing said or done by 
him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office.”96 
Since its decision in Johnson, the Court has increasingly used its own 
Speech or Debate precedent to narrow the privilege.  The Speech or Debate 
Clause continued to be interpreted broadly until the Burger Court’s Brewster 
and Gravel decisions.  Although Brewster recited the originalist themes of the 
Court’s Speech or Debate precedent, it based its holding on explicit language 
found in Johnson.97  In turn, Gravel applied Brewster’s legislative-political 
activity distinction in refusing to extend the Speech or Debate privilege to 
Senator Gravel’s activities.98 
The Burger Court’s Speech or Debate Clause decisions are, in some 
respects, at odds with aspects of an originalist understanding of the Clause’s 
scope.99  But, originalist arguments are not the only constitutional arguments 
that favor a more expansive interpretation of the Speech or Debate privilege.  
 
 93. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 636 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting WOODROW WILSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885)). 
 94. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  Specifically, Senator Ervin quotes Chief 
Justice Parsons’s claim that legislative activity is “every thing said or done by him, as a 
representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office; without inquiring whether the 
exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules.”  
Ervin, supra note 73, at 185 (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808)). 
 95. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). 
 96. Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27. 
 97. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 510 (1972) (noting the narrow scope of 
Johnson’s holding). 
 98. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622–27. 
 99. Indeed, in Gravel, the Burger Court relegated the representative-constituent 
communications, part of the informing function, as political, non-legislative activity, a 
characterization clearly at odds with the views expressed by Thomas Jefferson in response to the 
1797 indictment of Congressman Cabell.  See supra note 46. 
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Structural, ongoing history and consequential arguments each support the 
Court’s initial broad interpretation of the privilege.  To analyze these 
arguments generally, and the constitutionality of an executive search of a 
congressional office specifically, this Comment now turns to the facts of the 
Jefferson case. 
II.  THE WILLIAM JEFFERSON CASE 
A. The Search 
In 2005, the Justice Department began to investigate bribery allegations 
against Congressman William Jefferson.100  The allegations centered on 
whether Jefferson, in exchange for payment, used his position to promote the 
sale of the telecommunications equipment and services of iGate, a 
communications firm, to various African countries.101  In August 2005, after 
previously videotaping Jefferson receiving $100,000 cash, the Justice 
Department searched Jefferson’s Washington, D.C. residence.102  Quite 
infamously, the Justice Department recovered $90,000 cash from Jefferson’s 
freezer.103  In January 2006, former Jefferson aide, Brett Pfeffer, pleaded guilty 
to aiding and abetting the bribery of a public official.104  Vernon Jackson, iGate 
CEO, pleaded guilty to similar charges in May 2006.105 
In September 2005, the Justice Department subpoenaed records from 
Jefferson’s congressional office.106  Jefferson failed to comply with the 
subpoena.  On May 18, 2006, the Justice Department sought and received a 
search warrant from United States District Judge Thomas Hogan.107  The 
warrant application outlined “special search procedures” to account for Speech 
or Debate Clause concerns.108  A “Filter Team” was to sort the seized 
documents, shielding privileged materials from prosecutors and 
 
 100. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Washington, D.C. 
20515, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 105 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Allan Lengel, FBI Says Jefferson Was Filmed Taking Cash: Affidavit Details Sting on 
Lawmaker, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, at A1. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Congressional Legislative Assistant Brett 
M. Pfeffer Pleads Guilty in Bribery Scheme (Jan. 11, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
usao/vae/Pressreleases/01-JanuaryPDFArchive/06/20060111pfefferpr.pdf. 
 105. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Businessman Pleads Guilty to Paying Bribes to U.S. 
Congressman (May 3, 2006), available at http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/ 
pressrel06/wfo050306.htm. 
 106. House Hearing, supra note 1, at 2. 
 107. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Washington, D.C. 
20515, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 105 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 108. Id. 
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investigators.109  Any computer files seized could be accessed only through 
search terms specified in the warrant.110  On May 20, 2006, the Justice 
Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) searched Jefferson’s 
congressional office.111  During the search, Justice Department and FBI 
officials seized a wide range of documents and Jefferson’s entire computer 
hard drive.112  Justice Department officials also barred counsel for the House of 
Representatives and counsel for Jefferson from observing the search.113 
B. Congressional Response 
Members of Congress and other commentators immediately condemned 
the search as a violation of the separation of powers.114  James Sensenbrenner, 
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, held a hearing on the 
search.115  The hearing involved no representatives from the Justice 
Department and the testimony unanimously condemned the search.116  Despite 
being arguably one-sided, the hearing testimony focused on four points. 
First, members of Congress are not above the law.117  No one, not even 
Jefferson, objected when the Justice Department searched Jefferson’s private 
residence.  The objections to the search of a congressional office then are 
necessarily based on another ground—that is, protecting Congress’s 
institutional interests.118 
Second, the hearing witnesses unanimously found that the search violated 
the separation of powers.  Because the Speech or Debate Clause “prevent[s] 
intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile 
judiciary,”119 the involvement of the judiciary, through the warrant process, 
does nothing to alleviate the separation of powers concerns.120  Similarly, the 
Justice Department “Filter Team” also fails to address Speech or Debate 
 
 109. Id. at 105–06.  The “Filter Team” consisted of Justice Department attorneys and agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation otherwise unaffiliated with the Jefferson investigation.  Id. 
at 106. 
 110. Id. at 105. 
 111. Id. at 106. 
 112. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra note 3. 
 115. House Hearing, supra note 1. 
 116. Id.; see also Carle Hulse, House Plans to Call Gonzalez to Justify Search of Office, 
N.Y.TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A17. 
 117. House Hearing, supra note 1, at 2. 
 118. Id. at 23 (statement of Robert S. Walker) (“[W]hat we are discussing today is not about 
special rights for individual Congressmen, but the inherent rights the Constitution provides for 
Congress.”). 
 119. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966). 
 120. House Hearing, supra note 1, at 26. 
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concerns, as members of the Justice Department must examine each seized 
document and determine whether it pertains to a privileged legislative act.121 
Third, the Speech or Debate Clause protects not only certain “categories” 
of information (legislative acts) from the inquiry of the other branches, but also 
demands certain “processes” for obtaining information from Congress.122  The 
Legislative Branch itself, not an executive “Filter Team,” must be allowed to 
review requested documents to determine their privileged or non-privileged 
nature.123  This vetting process would allow Congress to object to the seizure 
of any documents deemed to involve legislative activities.124 
Lastly, Congress must take action to protect its constitutional 
prerogative.125  Two hearing witnesses recommended that Congress enact a 
statute similar to the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,126 enacted in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s Zurcher v. Stanford Daily decision.127  Chairman 
Sensenbrenner echoed the call for a statutory protection and promised 
immediate action.128 
On May 25, 2006, in response to growing criticism, President Bush had the 
seized items sealed and turned over to the Solicitor General for forty-five days 
until a resolution could be reached.129  The forty-five day moratorium expired 
on July 9, 2006. 
C. The District Court Decision 
On July 10, 2006, Chief District Judge Thomas Hogan held that the search 
of Jefferson’s congressional office did not violate the Speech or Debate 
Clause, the general principle of separation of powers, or the Fourth 
Amendment.130  In rejecting Jefferson’s separation of powers argument, Judge 
Hogan stated that the intervention of the judiciary, as a neutral third party, 
 
 121. Id. at 3. 
 122. Id. at 10. 
 123. Id at 8. 
 124. Id. 
 125. House Hearing, supra note 1, at 44 (Professor Jonathan Turley recommending 
enactment of statute similar to the Privacy Protection Act); id. at 48 (statement of Bruce Fein 
recommending a statute similar to the Privacy Protection Act). 
 126. Id. at 44 and 48 (Professor Johnathan Turley and Bruce Fein, Principal, The Lichfield 
Group, Inc., recommended enacting a statute similar to the Privacy Protection Act of 1980). 
 127. Id. at 46–47 and 48. 
 128. Id. at 49. 
 129. Id. at 2. 
 130. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Washington, D.C. 
20515, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 119 (D.D.C. 2006).  Jefferson’s Fourth Amendment arguments 
centered on the Justice Department’s barring of his counsel from his Rayburn Building office 
during the search.  Id. at 117.  Further, Jefferson argued that the warrant falsely stated that all 
lesser intrusive means had been exhausted.  Id.  These claims were rejected by Judge Hogan, id. 
at 117–18, but are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
268 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:253 
alleviated separation of powers concerns.131  However, the primary issue 
facing Judge Hogan was “whether the Speech or Debate Clause’s privileges 
and immunities extend so far as to insulate a Member of Congress from the 
execution of a valid search warrant on his congressional office.”132 
Judge Hogan’s analysis began by recognizing that the “Speech or Debate 
Clause provides both a testimonial privilege and immunity from liability for 
legitimate legislative acts.”133  Jefferson argued that the testimonial privilege 
was absolute, citing cases in which executive attempts to enforce subpoenas 
were denied because the subpoenas sought privileged legislative material.134  
Judge Hogan rejected Jefferson’s argument, distinguishing between a subpoena 
and a search warrant.135  Judge Hogan reasoned that producing evidence in 
response to a subpoena was a testimonial act, whereas having the same 
evidence seized subject to a valid search warrant involves no testimonial 
component.136  Because a search warrant does not involve a testimonial 
component, its execution does not violate the privilege provided by the Speech 
or Debate Clause.137  Judge Hogan supported his decision with four arguments. 
First, as a testimonial privilege, Judge Hogan compared the Speech or 
Debate Clause to the Fifth Amendment, arguing that “[a] party is privileged 
from producing evidence, not from its production.”138  “[A] search warrant 
does not trigger the Fifth Amendment’s testimonial privilege because there is 
no compulsion to speak or act.”139  Similarly, because Jefferson was not made 
to say or do anything as a result of the search, Judge Hogan determined that 
Jefferson was not “questioned in any way,” and the Speech or Debate Clause 
was not triggered.140 
Second, Judge Hogan stated that “legislative material is [not] absolutely 
privileged from review by or disclosure to either of the co-equal branches of 
government.”141  The Speech or Debate Clause does not provide for 
confidentiality; its purpose is not to promote the secrecy of legislative 
activity.142  Therefore, “[t]he Speech or Debate Clause is not undermined by 
 
 131. Id. at 116.  Indeed, Judge Hogan made short work of the separation of powers argument, 
disposing of it in three paragraphs.  See id. at 116–17.  Further, Judge Hogan viewed the 
Legislative Branch’s claim to a unilateral and unreviewable power to invoke an absolute privilege 
as the only threat posed to the separation of powers.  Id. at 117. 
 132. Id. at 110. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 111. 
 135. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 111. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (citing Johnson v. U.S., 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)). 
 139. Id. at 111–12 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976)). 
 140. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 112. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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the mere incidental review of privileged legislative material, given that 
Congressman Jefferson may never be questioned regarding his legitimate 
legislative activities [and] is immune from civil or criminal liability for those 
activities.”143 
Third, to refute Jefferson’s claim that the Speech or Debate Clause 
mandated advanced notice of an impending search to a Congressman, Judge 
Hogan cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.144  In 
Zurcher, the Supreme Court declined to accommodate First Amendment 
concerns by requiring the use of subpoenas or advanced notice prior to Fourth 
Amendment searches of newsrooms.145  Comparably, Judge Hogan found that 
no additional preconditions were required to accommodate Speech or Debate 
Clause concerns.146 
Lastly, Judge Hogan rejected the claim that judicial review of legislative 
documents to determine the scope of the Speech or Debate privilege was 
unconstitutional.147  He emphasized that members of Congress, like federal 
judges and the President, lack the power to determine the scope of their own 
privilege.148  The Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon, used various 
Speech or Debate precedents in holding that President Nixon lacked the power 
to determine the scope of his privilege.149 
On July 28, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
subsequently granted Jefferson a modest victory, ordering that the Justice 
Department refrain from reviewing the seized documents until Jefferson was 
provided copies and allowed to file objections.150  On November 14, 2006, the 
 
 143. Id. at 114. 
 144. Id. at 113.  Judge Hogan’s reliance on Zurcher, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), is ironic, Zurcher 
having caused the Congress to enact the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 
Stat. 1879 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5, 2000aa-6, 2000aa-7, 2000aa-
11, 2000aa-12), S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950, 3950–51 
(“This legislation was prompted by Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) . . . .”), which 
greatly restricted the ability of the government to conduct Fourth Amendment searches of 
newsrooms and implemented a prior notice requirement.  Indeed, in reversing Judge Hogan, the 
D.C. Circuit found reliance on Zurcher to be “misplaced.”  United States v. Rayburn House 
Office Building, Room 2113, Washington, D.C., 20515, 497 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see 
discussion of Zurcher, infra Part III.D.1. 
 145. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (citing Zurcher, 
436 U.S. at 567). 
 146. Id. at 113–14. 
 147. Id. at 114. 
 148. Id. at 114–15. 
 149. Id. at 115 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–05 (1974)). 
 150. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, Washington, DC 20515, No. 
06-3105, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 19466 (D.C. Cir. July 28, 2006). 
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Justice Department was allowed to review seized documents Jefferson 
conceded as non-privileged.151 
D. Summary and Comment 
Members of Congress, commentators and Judge Hogan agree on what is at 
issue.  Importantly, what is not at issue is the applicability of the nation’s laws 
to members of Congress—members have no general immunity to the laws of 
the United States.152  Indeed, no one, including Jefferson himself, cried foul 
when the Justice Department searched Jefferson’s private residence.153  All 
involved understand that no constitutional issue is raised by such a search.  Nor 
has it been argued that there is anything inherently sacrosanct about a 
congressional office itself.  To borrow an extreme example, if a homicide was 
committed within a congressional office, the entry of Executive Branch 
officials to perform an investigation and remove evidence connected to the 
crime would raise no Speech or Debate Clause concerns.154  But, such a 
scenario, unlike the William Jefferson case, lacks the elements of executive 
intimidation of a member of Congress. 
Instead, the issue posed by the Jefferson case can be aptly stated as 
whether a judicially-authorized Executive Branch search of the office of a 
member of Congress, during a corruption investigation, violates the Speech or 
Debate Clause.155  From this point, Congress and Judge Hogan (and the Justice 
Department) diverge sharply in their respective answers.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51 that “the great security against a 
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in 
giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”156  
Madison’s statement importantly suggests that the encroachments of one 
 
 151. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, Washington, DC 20515, No. 
06-3105, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28335 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2006). 
 152. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Washington, D.C. 
20515, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (D.D.C. 2006); House Hearing, supra note 1. 
 153. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 110 n.6. 
 154. Id. at 110. 
 155. See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (“The issue 
here is whether the Speech or Debate Clause’s privileges and immunities extend so far as to 
insulate a Member of Congress from the execution of a valid search warrant on his congressional 
office.”); House Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (“A constitutional question is raised when 
communications between Members of Congress and their constituents, documents having nothing 
whatsoever to do with any crime, are seized by the executive branch.”). 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 160 (James Madison) (2d ed., Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). 
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branch on another will be gradual, rather than dramatic, in form.157  But, the 
point at which cumulative encroachment by one branch on another violates the 
concept of separation of powers will not always be clear.158  One thing is clear, 
however, as it relates to the Speech or Debate Clause: since the Burger Court’s 
1972 Brewster and Gravel decisions, the potential threat posed to Congress has 
risen sharply.159  As the Executive Branch investigates members of Congress 
with increasing frequency, the potential exists for a corresponding increase in 
(unprecedented) separation of powers issues to occur.  The search of 
Congressman Jefferson’s office is the most recent example.160  But, as 
Madison also states, Congress was given the constitutional means, through the 
Speech or Debate Clause, to resist Executive and Judicial Branch 
encroachments.  Originalist, structural, ongoing history, and consequential 
arguments favor a broader Speech or Debate privilege.  Congress, through a 
statute, can redefine more broadly the scope of protected “legislative activities” 
and mandate the subpoena method for Executive Branch document requests. 
A. Reversing the District Court161 
Judge Hogan wrongly held that the search of Congressman Jefferson’s 
office did not violate the Speech or Debate Clause.162  Even if “legislative 
 
 157. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 464 (1991). 
 158. Id. at 476. 
Central to [the separation of powers concept] are three simultaneous insights: (1) the very 
fact of the concentration of political power in the hands of one governmental organ is 
unacceptable, even absent a showing of misuse of that power; (2) it will, as a practical 
matter, be all but impossible to determine when the level of concentration of political 
power has reached the danger point; and (3) the point at which such an unacceptable 
concentration is actually reached is too late for the situation to be remedied.  Separation of 
powers guarantees are, then, prophylactic in nature.  They are designed to avoid a 
situation in which one might even debate whether an undue accretion of power has taken 
place.  In short, the idea is to provide a buffer zone between government and the accretion 
of even potentially abusive power. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 159. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 160. A Fourth Amendment search of a congressional office is unprecedented in the nation’s 
history.  See House Hearing, supra note 1. 
 161. The D.C. Circuit in fact reversed Judge Hogan on August 3, 2007.  United States v. 
Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, Washington, D.C., 20515, 497 F.3d 654, 654 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007).  The footnotes of this Part III.A. include, in relevant detail, the D.C. Circuit’s 
discussion of Judge Hogan’s decision. 
 162. See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Room No. 2113 Washington, D.C. 
20515, 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 119 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding the search to be constitutional).  The 
D.C. Circuit disagreed with Judge Hogan’s conclusion.  See Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 
F.3d at 663.   
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activities” are given the narrow definition afforded by Brewster,163 the general 
search of Congressman Jefferson’s office likely allowed the Justice 
Department to seize documents and files related to protected legislative 
activity.164  Jefferson’s entire computer hard drive and boxes of documents 
were seized during the search.165  Drafts of speeches, reports in preparation for 
debate or committee meetings, and personal notes on pending legislation were 
likely captured.166  Judge Hogan made extensive efforts to characterize the 
search as narrow in scope, noting that the warrant “application described in 
detail the paper documents to be seized and the precise search terms to be used 
in examining the computer files.”167  But, Judge Hogan implicitly recognized 
that at least some legislative material was seized and reviewed by the Justice 
Department, merely dismissing such review as “incidental.”168 
Because the general search of Jefferson’s office exposed or allowed the 
seizure of legislative materials, the search violated the Speech or Debate 
Clause if a search of a congressional office constitutes a questioning.  Judge 
Hogan held that a Fourth Amendment search is not a questioning because the 
search did not compel Jefferson to do or say anything; the Speech or Debate 
Clause’s testimonial privilege was not triggered.169  But, limiting the Speech or 
Debate privilege to a testimonial privilege contradicts the plain command of 
the Clause’s text and purpose.  As Judge Hogan correctly stated, a testimonial 
privilege (such as the Fifth Amendment) “protects one from being compelled 
to answer questions.”170  “A party is privileged from producing the evidence, 
but not from its production.”171  Importantly, a testimonial privilege protects a 
 
 163. Under Brewster, legislative activities are limited to “things generally said or done in the 
House or the Senate in the performance of official duties and into the motivation for those acts.”  
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). 
 164. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d at 661.  (“The search of Congressman Jefferson’s 
office must have resulted in the disclosure of legislative materials to agents of the Executive.  
Indeed, the application accompanying the warrant contemplated it.”); see also House Hearing, 
supra note 1, at 27. 
 165. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 106; House Hearing, 
supra note 1, at 27. 
 166. See House Hearing, supra note 1, at 27. 
 167. In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 105. 
 168. Id. at 114.  The D.C. Circuit took issue with the characterization of executive review as 
“incidental.”  Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d at 661 (“While the Executive characterizes 
what occurred as the ‘incidental review of arguably protected legislative materials,’ it does not 
deny that compelled review by the Executive occurred, nor that it occurred in a location where 
legislative materials were inevitably to be found, nor that some impairment of legislative 
deliberations occurred.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 169. See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 112. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 111 (citing Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] IN SEARCH OF CONGRESS 273 
party from a compelled response to a question.  Indeed, Judge Hogan 
emphasized that the search did not compel Jefferson to respond in any way.172 
But, while a testimonial privilege is certainly inherent in the Speech or 
Debate privilege, the text of the Clause places its emphasis elsewhere—the 
Senators and Representatives “shall not be questioned.”173  The Clause places 
the burden on would-be questioners, demanding that the co-ordinate branches 
refrain from inquiring into legislative acts.174  The privilege is therefore 
broader than a testimonial privilege; legislative material is absolutely 
privileged from review by or disclosure to either of the co-equal branches of 
government.175  Johnson’s classic statement of the Clause’s purpose, “to 
prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly 
hostile judiciary,” supports this interpretation.176  The Executive and Judicial 
Branches do not enjoy the ability to seize and examine legislative materials at 
their independent or combined will.  Judge Hogan’s dismissal of the Justice 
Department’s review of legislative materials as “incidental” grossly ignores the 
central premise of the Speech or Debate protection—to prevent the 
intimidation of the Legislative Branch.177  Knowledge by members of 
Congress that the Executive Branch could seize and review their files at any 
moment is the essence of intimidation and is disruptive to the due functioning 
of the Legislative Branch.178  Judge Hogan incorrectly decided otherwise.  An 
Executive Branch search of the office of a member of Congress, even when 
pursuant to a warrant, violates the Speech or Debate Clause. 
 
 172. Id. at 112. 
 173. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 174. Even in its narrow interpretation, Brewster recognized that it is the inquiry itself that is 
prohibited.  United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 527 (1972). 
 175. Judge Hogan rejected this broader interpretation, noting that the purpose of the Clause is 
not to promote secrecy in the legislative function.  See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office 
Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 112.  However, the D.C. Circuit recognized that the Speech or Debate 
Clause in fact includes a “non-disclosure privilege” and “rejected the view that the testimonial 
immunity of the Speech or Debate Clause applies only when Members or their aides are 
personally questioned.”  Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d at 660 (citing Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 176. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966). 
 177. Id.  Judge Hogan mentions “intimidation” only twice in his opinion, but not once in 
substantive discussion of the validity of the search.  See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office 
Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d at 108–16. 
 178. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d at 661 at *6 (“[C]ompelled disclosure clearly 
tends to disrupt the legislative process: exchanges between a Member of Congress . . . on 
legislative matters may legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the possibility of 
compelled disclosure may therefore chill the exchange of views with respect to legislative 
activity.  This chill runs counter to the Clause’s purpose of protecting against disruption of the 
legislative process.”); see also House Hearing, supra note 1, at 11 (describing elements of 
executive intimidation embodied by the search). 
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B. Constitutional Arguments for an Expanded Speech or Debate Privilege 
Judge Hogan’s decision represents the most recent judicial narrowing of 
the Speech or Debate Clause protection.  An Executive Branch search of a 
congressional office is an affront to Congress as a co-equal branch of 
government.  The question then becomes whether Congress possesses the 
constitutional means to protect itself from further encroachment.  As 
previously discussed, an originalist understanding of the Speech or Debate 
Clause dictates a broader interpretation of the text than currently afforded by 
the courts.179  Indeed, history indicates that the Framers understood “Speech or 
Debate” as a term of art, encompassing a broad range of acts necessary for the 
legislature to undertake its legislative function.180  Additionally, other 
constitutional arguments (often completely or partially ignored by courts) favor 
an expanded privilege and a greater congressional role in its implementation. 
1. The Structural Argument 
The Constitution’s structure indicates that Congress should control the 
scope of its Speech or Debate privilege.  Congress is the only branch of 
government granted an express privilege by the Constitution.181  Neither the 
Executive nor the Judicial Branch was granted an express constitutional 
privilege.182  Further, the Speech or Debate Clause has a clear role in the 
separation of powers system, as the Supreme Court correctly recognized in 
Johnson.183  To repeat Johnson’s apt statement of the Clause’s purpose, the 
Clause “prevent[s] intimidation by the executive and accountability before a 
possibly hostile judiciary.”184  As a bulwark of the separation of powers, and in 
light of Johnson’s express recognition of its purpose, it is unseemly that the 
determination of the Clause’s scope rests with a co-ordinate branch against 
which the Clause is designed to protect the Congress.  Placing the privilege in 
the hands of the Judicial Branch could ultimately lead to no privilege at all. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has created a curious result.  The Court has 
created extra-constitutional immunity for Judicial and Executive officials that 
extends immunity to their official acts.185  In contrast, Brewster, while 
recognizing “political” activities as “entirely legitimate activities,” declined to 
 
 179. See supra Part I.D. 
 180. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
 181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  In addition to the Speech or Debate privilege, the 
Constitution also privileges members of Congress from arrest “during their Attendance at the 
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.” Id. 
 182. See U.S. CONST. arts. II, III. 
 183. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (executive immunity); Bradley v. 
Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335 (1871) (judicial immunity). 
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grant them Speech or Debate protection.186  In Doe v. McMillan, the Court 
declined to extend extra-constitutional immunity to members of Congress for 
their “political” acts, holding that “[t]he scope of inquiry becomes equivalent 
to the inquiry in the context of the Speech or Debate Clause, and the answer is 
the same.”187  Congress should find it odd that its privilege, though the only 
express constitutional privilege, is narrower in scope than the judicially created 
immunity for judicial and executive officials.  Indeed, the Court’s 
interpretation of the Speech or Debate privilege since 1972 has been 
increasingly restrictive.  The Constitution’s structure dictates the opposite 
result.  Congress should control the scope of its Speech or Debate privilege. 
2. Ongoing Practice 
While the Supreme Court has often utilized originalist arguments and its 
own precedent, the Court has often ignored a third type of historical 
argument—ongoing practice.  Ongoing practice most readily shapes the 
meaning of constitutional provisions involving institutional behavior rather 
than individual rights.188  In this regard, it is notable that objections to the 
search center on Congress’s institutional interests, not the protection of 
Congressman Jefferson.189 
The ongoing practice that has developed between the Justice Department 
and the Congress concerning corruption investigations also favors greater 
congressional control over the Speech or Debate privilege.  During the 1970s, 
the Justice Department increased its efforts to combat public corruption.190  
Professor Charles Tiefer served as Assistant Legal Counsel to the Senate from 
1979 to 1984 and Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel to the House of 
Representatives from 1984 to 1995.191  During his hearing testimony, Professor 
Tiefer recounted the numerous Justice Department investigations that occurred 
during his tenure.192  Over the course of those investigations, Congress and the 
Justice Department established protocols to facilitate Executive Branch 
investigations, while respecting the Congress’s Speech or Debate privilege.193  
The longstanding practice that developed between Congress and the Justice 
Department was memorialized in the United States Attorney’s Manual: 
 
 186. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). 
 187. 412 U.S. 306, 324 (1973). 
 188. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(stating that historical practices could be appropriate in cases in which “the great principles of 
liberty are not concerned . . . .”). 
 189. House Hearing, supra note 1, at 23. 
 190. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 191. House Hearing, supra note 1, at 6. 
 192. Id. at 7–8 (ABSCAM and Reps. Flake, Biaggi, Rostenkowski, Swindall, and McDade). 
 193. See id. at 10. 
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[B]oth the House and the Senate consider that the Speech and Debate Clause 
gives them an institutional right to refuse requests for information that 
originate in the Executive or the Judicial Branches that concern the legislative 
process.  Thus, most requests for information and testimony dealing with the 
legislative process must be presented to the Chamber affected, and that 
Chamber permitted to vote on whether or not to produce the information 
sought.  This applies to grand jury subpoenas, and to requests that seek 
testimony as well as documents.  The customary practice when seeking 
information from the Legislative Branch which is not voluntarily forthcoming 
from a Senator or Member is to route the request through the Clerk of the 
House or the Secretary of the Senate.  This process can be time-consuming.  
However, bona fide requests for information bearing on ongoing criminal 
inquiries have been rarely refused.194 
Although ongoing practice does not definitively interpret the Speech or Debate 
Clause, such practices “ought not to be lightly disregarded.”195  Certainly, the 
ongoing practice between the Justice Department and Congress respected 
Congress’s role in administering its Speech or Debate privilege. 
3. The Consequential Argument 
Strong consequential arguments raised in Brewster weigh both in favor of 
and against an expanded congressional privilege.  In Brewster, the Court 
rejected outright Congress’s ability to punish the misbehavior of its own 
members.196  Brewster seemingly lies in direct contradiction to Article I, which 
grants Congress the ability to punish and expel its members.197 
Two arguments were central to the majority’s determination.  The majority 
first determined that “Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try, and punish its 
Members for a wide range of behavior that is loosely and incidentally related 
to the legislative process.”198  The majority explained that the congressional 
disciplinary process lacks the procedural safeguards inherent in the judicial 
process and is vulnerable to partisanship.199  Moreover, the majority cited 
 
 194. U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 2046, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ 
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02046.htm. 
 195. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). 
 196. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 518–20 (1972). 
 197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 198. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 518. 
 199. The Brewster majority asserted:  
The process of disciplining a Member in the Congress is not without countervailing risks 
of abuse since it is not surrounded with the panoply of protective shields that are present 
in a criminal case.  An accused Member is judged by no specifically articulated standards 
and is at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body that functions 
at once as accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury from whose decision there is no established 
right of review.  In short, a Member would be compelled to defend in what would be 
comparable to a criminal prosecution without the safeguards provided by the Constitution.  
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Congress’s widely-acknowledged, poor record of punishing its Members for 
misbehavior.200  And, as Brewster appropriately stated, “financial abuses by 
way of bribes, perhaps even more than Executive power, . . . gravely 
undermine legislative integrity and defeat the right of the public to honest 
representation.”201 
The Brewster majority raises a fairly compelling argument against a 
broader Speech or Debate privilege.  However, the majority’s arguments 
ultimately fall short.  For starters, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, 
“Courts are not the place for such controversies.  Self-discipline and the voters 
must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.”202  
Senator Ervin echoed Justice Brennan’s conclusion, noting that the Framers 
made an explicit choice to leave the punishment of members of Congress to 
their respective Houses.203  Therefore, the majority’s claims of judicial 
superiority in the trial of corrupt congressmen, while valid on their face, are 
moot, the Framers having made a clear textual commitment to the Houses of 
Congress.204 
The argument that Congress is a poor punisher of its own members is 
similarly unavailing.  The Justice Department need not refer to legislative acts 
to prove that a member is guilty of bribery.  Johnson and Brewster draw the 
line correctly—if bribery makes it a crime to solicit or receive remuneration in 
exchange for promised legislative acts, it is unnecessary to inquire into a 
member’s legislative acts, and the Speech or Debate Clause should pose no 
obstacle to the vigorous enforcement of the nation’s laws by the Executive.205  
 
Moreover, it would be somewhat naïve to assume that the triers would be wholly 
objective and free from considerations of party and politics and the passions of the 
moment.  Strong arguments can be made that trials conducted in a Congress with an 
entrenched majority from one political party could result in far greater harassment than a 
conventional criminal trial with the wide range of procedural protections for the accused, 
including indictment by grand jury, trial by jury under strict standards of proof with fixed 
rules of evidence, and extensive appellate review.  
Id. at 519–20 (internal citations omitted). 
 200. Id. at 519 (“Congress has shown little inclination to exert itself in this area.”); see also 
HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 283 (2006) (noting Congress’s poor self-policing record and citing 
Congress’s tolerance of Sen. Joseph McCarthy as an example); Note, The Bribed Congressman’s 
Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 349 n.84 (1965). 
 201. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 524–25. 
 202. Id. at 544 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 
(1951)). 
 203. Ervin, supra note 73, at 183. 
 204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 205. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 527 (majority opinion); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 
185 (1966). 
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To be sure, the Constitution mandates that the Executive enforce the laws.206  
But, the Speech or Debate Clause did not restrain the Justice Department from 
vigorously fulfilling its constitutional mandate in Congressman Jefferson’s 
case.  The Justice Department had compiled witnesses, informants, videotapes, 
illicit funds, and incriminating statements against Jefferson.207  The search of 
Jefferson’s congressional office lacked any compelling necessity.  Therefore, it 
does not follow that a broader Speech or Debate privilege will inhibit Justice 
Department prosecutions of corrupt members of Congress.  Still, any 
consequential argument favoring a more robust Speech or Debate privilege is 
made stronger by a congressional commitment to an internal disciplinary 
process to punish and expel its corrupt members.  As of yet, Congress has 
failed to make that commitment.  If Congress is to have a greater privilege, it 
must recognize its greater, corresponding responsibility. 
C. Congress’s Statutory Solution 
As argued thus far, the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the 
Speech or Debate privilege does not comport with the broader conceptions 
supported by ongoing practice or originalist, structural, and consequential 
reasoning.  Congress can protect its institutional interests and control its 
Speech or Debate privilege through statutory means.  Any statute enacted to 
this end must address the categories of “legislative activity” protected by the 
Speech or Debate Clause.  Further, the statute should mandate the subpoena 
process for Executive Branch document requests from Congress. 
1. Redefining the Scope of Protected “Legislative Activity” 
Congress’s redefining of the scope of protected legislative activities is long 
overdue.208  Brewster and its progeny have severely restricted the protection 
available to members of Congress.  Restricting “legislative acts” to votes and 
speeches or debates on the House floor or in committee, and classifying all 
other activities performed by members as political “errands” borders on 
insulting Congress.209 
In fact, Congress has previously tried to define the scope of legislative 
activity, only to watch its attempt fall victim to poor political timing.  In the 
 
 206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 207. See supra Part II.A. 
 208. Ervin, supra note 73; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 18. 
 209. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).  It is odd that Brewster 
recognizes “political” activities as “entirely legitimate activities,” but then proceeds to label them 
as “errands.”  See id.  During his hearing testimony, Professor Jonathan Turley characterized the 
search of Jefferson’s office as “a profound and almost gratuitous insult to a co-equal branch of 
Government.”  House Hearing, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
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wake of Brewster’s narrow definition of the legislative activity, Senator Ervin 
proposed a bill redefining “legislative activity” more broadly to mean: 
any activity relating to the due functioning of the legislative process and 
carrying out the obligations a Member of Congress owes to the Congress and 
to his constituents and shall include, but not be limited to, speaking, debating 
or voting in Committee or on the floor of Congress, receipt of information for 
use in legislative proceedings, any conduct in Committee related to the 
consideration of legislation or related to the conduct of an investigation, 
speeches, or publications outside of Congress informing the public on matters 
of national or local importance, and the motives and decision-making process 
leading to the above activity or leading to the decision not to engage in the 
above activity.210 
Senator Ervin’s Bill failed to come up for a vote in the aftermath of Watergate; 
Congress lacked the political ability to argue against President Nixon’s claims 
of executive privilege while bolstering its own legislative privilege.211  The 
political situation in the wake of the Jefferson search fares no better for 
Congress.  Polls indicate that a substantial majority of Americans supported 
the Justice Department’s search.212  There is little doubt that expanding the 
scope of their legislative privilege is a tough political sell and will subject 
members of Congress to criticism.213 
However, Congress has an institutional prerogative to protect itself as a co-
ordinate branch of government.  Senator Ervin’s proposed definition of 
“legislative activity” incorporates constituent-representative communications 
and facilitates the informing function, two areas contested following the 
Court’s Brewster and Gravel decisions, but entirely consistent with a broader 
interpretation of the Speech or Debate privilege.  Broadening the privilege’s 
scope is an important first step for Congress. 
2. Mandating the Subpoena Method 
But, merely expanding the “categories” of legislative acts falling within the 
Clause’s scope does not sufficiently protect Congress.214  Instead, as Professor 
Tiefer testified, Congress must also establish “processes” to prevent potential 
 
 210. 119 CONG. REC. 9089 (1973). 
 211. See Richard D. Batchelder, Jr., Chastain v. Sundquist:  A Narrow Reading of the 
Doctrine of Legislative Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV.  384, 407 (1990). 
 212. Editorial, Illegal Search, ROLL CALL, June 7, 2006, at 4 (citing ABC News poll showing 
that ninety percent of Americans supported the Justice Department’s search). 
 213. House Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Rep. Issa, Member, House Comm. on 
the Judiciary) (“[T]he American people do not begin to understand why there is a concern.  Their 
assumption, quite rightfully, is no one is above the law.  Hopefully today . . . people will begin to 
understand that it has always been a big deal when one branch of Government . . . cast[s] some 
question of the sovereignty of the other branch.”). 
 214. Id. at 10. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
280 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:253 
intimidation by the other branches.215  Echoing a similar theme, two witnesses 
at the hearing urged the adoption of a congressional version of the Privacy 
Protection Act of 1980.216  This Comment endorses that recommendation. 
Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act in response to the Supreme 
Court’s 1978 decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.217  In Zurcher, the Palo 
Alto police, pursuant to a warrant, searched the newsroom of the Stanford 
Daily, a Stanford University student newspaper.218  The Stanford Daily had 
published photographs of a riot in which nine Palo Alto officers were 
injured.219  The police seized the negatives, film, and pictures depicting the 
assault on the injured officers during their clash with rioters.220  The Supreme 
Court declined to accommodate First Amendment concerns by requiring the 
use of subpoenas or advanced notice prior to Fourth Amendment searches of 
newsrooms.221  In response, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act to 
require the subpoena method in the First Amendment context.222 
Congress should pass a statute similar to the Privacy Protection Act 
pursuant to the Speech or Debate privilege.  Requiring the subpoena method 
would codify what has long been the practice between Congress and the 
Justice Department.223  The statute would mandate that, when investigating a 
member of Congress, the Justice Department issue a subpoena to the affected 
House.  The House, fully capable of inquiring into all activities of its members, 
can determine whether the subpoenaed materials are legislative.  If the 
subpoenaed materials are legislative, Congress determines the extent to which 
it will punish the member.  Only Congress may punish its members for their 
legislative acts.224  If the subpoenaed materials are not legislative, Congress 
would provide the requested information to the Justice Department for use in a 
criminal prosecution.  Those skeptical of this arrangement need only recall the 
 
 215. Id. Noting that the categories of legislative materials that receive constitutional 
protection are important, Professor Tiefer testified at length about the important procedural 
elements demanded by the Speech or Debate Clause.  Id.  Central to Professor Tiefer’s testimony 
was his own experience in developing the subpoena method in cooperation with the Justice 
Department.  See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 125. 
 217. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 218. Id. at 551. 
 219. Id. at 550–51. 
 220. Id. at 551. 
 221. Id. at 566–67. 
 222. See supra note 144.   
 223. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [the 
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for 
disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”). 
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Justice Department’s own admission that “bona fide requests for information 
bearing on ongoing criminal inquiries have been rarely refused.”225 
CONCLUSION 
It light of recent scandals,226 the assertion that Congress is entitled to a 
broader Speech or Debate privilege, much less one that it controls unchecked 
by the other branches, may seem entirely backward.  To be sure, Congress has 
much work to do in ridding itself of its corrupt members.  Corrupt members of 
Congress are undesirable because they fail to faithfully and vigorously 
represent the interests of their constituents and instead bow to special 
interests.227 
The Framers envisioned a similarly undesirable result from the 
intimidation of Congress by the Executive and Judicial Branches.228  The 
Speech or Debate Clause was the remedy.  But, since the 1970s, Congress’s 
Speech or Debate privilege has been repeatedly narrowed by the courts and 
tested by the Justice Department.  The search of Congressman Jefferson’s 
office represents only the most recent example. 
Congress has an institutional prerogative to reassert itself as a co-equal 
branch of government.  Originalist, structural, ongoing history, and 
consequential arguments favor a broader Speech or Debate privilege.  
Congress, through a statute, can redefine more broadly the scope of protected 
“legislative activities” and mandate the subpoena method for Executive Branch 
document requests.  Congress need now only act. 
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 225. U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 2046, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ 
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02046.htm. 
 226. The Congress has also been shaken by scandals other than Congressman Jefferson’s, 
most notably the bribery of numerous congressmen by Jack Abramoff.   
 227. In Brewster’s words, “[F]inancial abuses by way of bribes . . . gravely undermine 
legislative integrity and defeat the right of the public to honest representation.”  United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524–25 (1972). 
 228. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).  The Speech or Debate Clause was 
placed in the Constitution “to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a 
possibly hostile judiciary.” Id. 
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